Measuring and aggregating social performance of microfinance investment vehicles by Meyer, Julia & Krauss, Annette
 
 
Center for Microfinance 
Department of Banking and Finance 
 
 
 
 
MEASURING AND AGGREGATING 
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE OF 
MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT VEHICLES 
 
 
 
 
 
Julia Meyer 
Annette Krauss 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMF Working Paper Series, No. 03‐2015 
March 31st, 2015 
MEASURING AND AGGREGATING  
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE  
OF MICROFINANCE INVESTMENT VEHICLES  
 
 
Julia Meyer*    Annette Krauss* 
 
 
March 31, 2015 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper develops a method to measure and compare social performance of microfinance in-
vestments at the level of microfinance investment vehicles. Drawing from measurement theory, 
it develops formal quality criteria that individual social performance indicators, the selection, 
and the aggregation of such indicators into a single metric need to satisfy. Social performance 
indicators are selected for both microfinance investment vehicles, and their underlying portfo-
lio. The method presented here uses data of the microfinance investment universe to determine 
a rating framework for the underlying of microfinance institutions, in addition to a unique set 
of variables captured at MIV level. The paper demonstrates the approach in a sample calcula-
tion and serves as a guideline for a future empirical application among microfinance investment 
vehicles.  
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G 21, G 23, O16 
 
Keywords:  microfinance investment vehicle, social performance, ESG measurement,  
ESG rating 
 
 
* Center for Microfinance, Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich. Corresponding author: 
julia.meyer@bf.uh.ch. We thank Catalina Martinez for comments and Urs Birchler for valuable support. We 
gratefully acknowledge financial support of the Swiss Finance Institute (SFI).  
 
 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The inclusion of microfinance in the investment universe of financial markets is relatively 
young. Transparent reporting is a prerequisite for microfinance to be acknowledged as an 
asset class or investment style, and to satisfy information needs of potential investors 
(Pouliot, 2006). To date, different microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) can compare 
their performance to two sets of financial performance indexes of MIVs (Meyer, 2013). 
With respect to so-called double-bottom line or social performance of investments, stand-
ardized MIV reporting is in its infancy at best.1  
Goodman (2006) classifies different MIVs according to their (social or development) ob-
jectives. However, the empirical literature that provides comparative or at least aggregat-
ed information on MIVs classifies them only according to legal or investment criteria (for 
instance, CGAP, 2010; Leleux and Constantinou, 2007). Even after the publication of MIV 
Disclosure Guidelines (CGAP, 2010), individual MIVs have been using their own ap-
proaches to measure and disclose social performance indicators, typically in short fund-
level fact sheets or within a yearly social performance report for the entire asset manage-
ment company. Based on these reports, it is not possible to compare the social perfor-
mance of one investment vehicle to another. 
1  We use a comprehensive definition of social performance as discussed for example in Copestake (2007) 
and Bédécerrats and Lapenu (2013), and operationalized for instance by the Social Performance Task 
Force (SPTF, 2014). It is not our aim to analyze and measure social impacts of microfinance, i.e. the as-
sessment of a change in welfare among clients that can be causally attributed to their access to or use of 
microfinance services (see for instance, Banerjee et al., 2015). 
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Few approaches exist in practice to empirically capture and compare social performance 
at MIV level (see in particular Sinha, 2010). They typically require due diligence processes 
at two levels. Effort is necessary not only for the MIV or microfinance investment fund or 
other vehicle but also at the level of the underlying, the microfinance institutions or non-
specialized microfinance providers2, where data needs to be collected and prepared to 
meet the requirements of the social performance measurement approach.  
In this paper, we develop a comparable and practicable method to measure the social 
performance of MIVs in an aggregate way. To do so, we proceed in several steps, as 
shown in Figure 1. First, we compare and analyze the social performance categories and 
indicators used in the different approaches to capture social performance in microfinance 
both at MFI and MIV level. We draw from social science measurement theory to measure 
and aggregate non-financial indicators, the literature on corporate ratings of Environ-
mental, Social and Governance aspects (ESG ratings), as well as the documentation of the 
diverse existing MIV reporting tools on social performance. Based on this body of litera-
ture, we establish a set of criteria to discuss the advantages and problems of the most fre-
quently used social performance categories and indicators used in the microfinance liter-
ature. This is shown in the left-hand side of Figure 1.  
2  We subsume both types of underlying investments under the acronym MFI, and funds and other vehicles 
under the acronym MIV, for simplicity reasons. See CGAP (2010) for a comprehensive definition of vari-
ous types of underlying on the one hand, and of microfinance investment intermediaries, MIVs, and mi-
crofinance investment funds on the other hand. 
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By applying these criteria, we then decide on a set of indicators that are incorporated in 
our social performance measurement approach to MIVs. To better capture the different 
stakeholder groups of microfinance, we differentiate between measures concerning the 
underlying MFIs and their performance towards clients, and measures collected at fund 
level and reported to investors. We define appropriate characteristics for each selected 
variable and merge them into a comprehensive data catalogue.  
Figure 1: Steps in Establishing an MIV Social Performance Index 
 
Figure 1 shows, on the right-hand side, our proceeding once this data catalogue is estab-
lished. For the resulting set of social performance variables, we analyze, on the one hand, 
MFI data, i.e. the underlying investments, shown in the lower part of Figure 1 (Step 1a). 
Using data from the Microfinance Information eXchange database on MFIs (shortly the 
MIX), we determine several moments (mainly distributions and averages) for the differ-
ent indicators, depending on their scale. This information enables us to then standardize, 
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score, or rank MFIs according to their social performance metrics in comparison with the 
peers. To use these MFI metrics in the social performance rating of a whole investment 
vehicle, it is necessary to aggregate the results on the performance of the underlying ap-
propriately. We discuss the need for special weighting of certain types of variables in our 
methodology section below.  
On the other hand, we apply the same criteria to establish a list of social performance in-
dicators at fund level that can be aggregated to a summary indicator per fund (shown in 
the upper part of Figure 1, Step 1b). We also discuss the non-trivial issues arising from 
the aggregation of data for the funds and their comparison between different types of 
investment vehicles and funds, in our methodology section below. 
In a last step (Step 2 in Figure 1) towards establishing a measurement metric for an MIV’s 
social performance, we combine the social performance of the underlying with certain 
indicators considered important for the MIV, resulting in one MIV level indicator com-
bining social performance measures at both MFI, and MIV levels.  
The resulting aggregated measurement has the characteristics of an index. The combina-
tion of indicators into an index is only meaningful if a certain variable of interest needs to 
be operationalized using a set of variables, for instance for reasons of complexity (Schnell 
et al., 2013). This is the case for social performance in microfinance. 
In the remainder of this paper, we summarize findings from the various streams of litera-
ture that we use to establish a list of social performance indicators for microfinance, and 
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criteria to use such indicators in aggregated measures (section 2). We describe and ana-
lyze the available data to establish an aggregated rating framework for the social perfor-
mance measures at MIV level in section 3. Our results section 4 presents the ranking scale 
for all MFI-level variables resulting from a calibration with MFI-level data from the MIX, 
and shows an example of the MIV social performance metric through simulating results 
for a fictional fund composed of a small sample of MFIs. While the simulation can be cal-
ibrated for MFI level data, the ranking for the social performance indicators cannot be 
done at MIV level because the current incomplete state of MIV reporting on social per-
formance does not allow calibrating our measures with the available data.  
Indeed, an important limitation of our analysis is the lack of available empirical data to 
apply our tool. We would need complete information on MIVs’ portfolio composition 
that would help us track and calculate empirical results of the social performance of the 
underlying portfolio using our rating criteria, as well as on the MIVs’ social performance 
variables themselves, again according to our established criteria. We aim at collecting 
such data from interested MIVs in our further research. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
The social performance of microfinance institutions and investment vehicles is still less 
documented less than the presumed impacts of microfinance. The literature on methods 
and results of measuring impacts of microfinance is abundant (Banerjee et al., 2015; 
Roodman and Morduch, 2014; Karlan and Goldberg, 2011). Selected aspects of MFI’s so-
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cial performance have been examined systematically, such as mission drift (Armendariz 
and Szafarz, 2011; Mersland and Strøm, 2010), and the relationship between financial per-
formance and outreach (Martinez, 2015; Meyer, 2015; Quayes, 2011). Yet, comprehensive 
empirical work on the range of social performance measurements in microfinance is still 
rare.  
Several comprehensive tools for understanding the social performance of microfinance 
service providers have been proposed, serving different purposes and audiences.3 Bé-
décarrats et al. (2013), Servet (2011), and Zeller et al. (2003) discuss several methodologi-
cal choices to be made in such measurements. The Rating Intiative’s Social Rating Guide 
(Clark and Sinha, 2013) selects and compares MFI social performance indicators drawing 
from the different MFI rating practices. The SPFT’s Universal Standards for Social Per-
formance Management (SPTF, 2014a) capture social performance issues according to typ-
ical MFI management and operational functions, such as governance, products, human 
resources etc. Moody’s (2012) social performance assessment tool (SPA) bases its meas-
urements on empirical data. It measures detailed scorecard approach results, converts 
them into assessment grades and uses MIX data on MFIs to analyze and benchmark the 
distributions obtained.  
3  In this paper, we focus on measurement and reporting purposes, whereas much more detailed tools are 
available for comprehensive social performance auditing and management as well, for instance CERISE 
(2015), SPTP (2014b), or for selected aspects within the social performance pathway, such as the Client 
Protection Principles (CPP).  
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In this paper, we largely follow Moody’s (2012) procedure in a simplified version. The 
SPA involves a complex process including site visits, but does not use specific techniques 
to aggregate the different scores defined, only giving a simple average of the different 
categories as final total SPA score. Our approach, in turn, relies on publicly available in-
dicators of underlying MFIs but shows the implications of different ways to aggregate 
results for the MIV level.  
Analyzing empirical wide-range social performance evidence for MFIs has typically been 
done in mere correlation analyses (see for instance, Bédécarrats et al, 2010, 2009; Pistelli et 
al., 2014). This captures the broad range of social performance indicators included, 
among them many non-metric variables, but does not seek to measure causal relation-
ships between different aspects of financial and social performance.  
At the level of MIVs, fewer attempts have been made to encourage and standardize re-
porting on social performance and using measurements for various purposes, from ex-
ternal reporting via auditing to rating. This paper builds on these approaches and com-
plements them by suggesting a rating and indexing method.  
Published as CGAP Consensus Guidelines, the MIV Disclosure Guidelines (CGAP, 2010) 
establish a comprehensive list of ESG reporting for MIVs in accordance with the report-
ing recommendations for the UN Principles or Responsible Investments (UN PRI), the 
Social Performance Task Force (SPTF) in microfinance, and the MIX. The guidelines are 
based on expert consultations and good practice recommendations for financial indica-
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tors and ESG measures; however, despite the postulated consensus, publicly available 
MIV reporting has not followed through to date. In contrast, Sinha (2010) develops an 
assessment tool of MIVs that has been subsequently applied to selected MIVs in a pilot by 
M-CRIL and SDC and that includes not only aggregated social performance indicators of 
the underlying portfolio, collected directly at MFI level, but also includes country-specific 
factors, something also recommended by Servet (2011). In this paper, we adapt Sinha’s 
(2010) approach to drop the environmental focus in our assessment of MIVs. Still, the da-
ta are insufficient to be used for the construction and wider application of an index.  
Cross-sectional empirical evidence on the social performance of MIVs is, indeed, still rare, 
and only aggregated empirical evidence about the social performance of microfinance 
investment vehicles is available. Martinez and Reille (2010) report anecdotal first evi-
dence on incorporating ESG practices in an MIV survey. While MicroRate’s annual MIV 
Survey focuses on financial performance aspect (MicroRate, 2013), the other main annual 
MIV Survey, published by Symbiotics (formerly jointly with CGAP), has included aggre-
gated information on selected key ESG practices of MIVs since 2009 (Symbiotics, 2014, 
2013; CGAP and Symbiotics, 2010, 2009). However, the variables reported tend to change 
over time, for instance, reporting on environmental practices being replaced by client 
protection in the latest issue. The aggregated information made available in the surveys 
make it impossible to use in a separate analysis and in constructing our index without 
further gathering primary data from the MIVs.  
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To address the methodological issues in our microfinance social performance measure-
ment, we draw from the broader social science and finance literature on corporate per-
formance and ESG measurements. Particularly relevant for our approach is the literature 
on aggregating ESG measurements, as mostly applied in ESG ratings (Chatterjee et al., 
2009; Sadowski et al, 2011; Windolph, 2013). Following Keller (2015), we use on a compi-
lation of procedural and formal criteria at macro and macro levels to assess the ad-
vantages and challenges of individual social-performance indicators. Keller’s (2015) ap-
proach allows assessing the quality of individual ESG rating methodologies. We proceed 
accordingly for the selection of social performance criteria that can be aggregated into a 
single measurement. 
Last but not least, the literature proposes several techniques for aggregating social per-
formance measures that go beyond or substitute simple weighting techniques as current-
ly used in ESG ratings or microfinance social performance measurements. We consider in 
particular data envelopment analyses (DEA) techniques such as discussed in Chen and 
Delmas (2010) as the most efficient methodology to capture corporate social performance. 
Another possibility to aggregate different social performance measures would be the as-
signment of weights according to statements by practitioners. MFI representatives would 
then need to be asked about the relevance of different factor and this measure would be 
continuously updated according to their proposition. A more objective methodology to 
aggregate the diverse indicators is the performance of a principal component analysis 
(Zeller et al. 2003). Nevertheless, the principal component analysis takes into account on-
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ly the number of indicators that are linearly uncorrelated. There is thus high probability 
that this procedure limits the set of indicators. A rather easy way to compare two institu-
tions is facilitated by a graphical presentation of different measures (Zeller et al. 2003).  
While DEA has been applied extensively to MFIs (see, for instance Bolli and Vo Thi, 2015; 
Balkenhol, 2007) principal component analysis, to our knowledge, has been used less for 
MFIs (Gutierrez-Nieto et al, 2007; Zeller et al., 2003). However, both techniques rely on 
large-scale available data from the underlying and at aggregate level and are, as such, 
feasible only once primary data on the composition of the underlying have been collected 
from a range of MIVs.  
In this paper, we use the findings of the above mentioned literature to select social per-
formance measures to be included in our social performance assessment procedure. We 
focus on a small number of categories in order to achieve a thematic match and create a 
tool that can be easily understood and implemented by funds and investors.  
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 DATA 
We use data from Microfinance Information eXchange database (MIX) for indicators at 
MFI level. We combine the publicly available basic data set on all MFIs with two addition-
al MIX datasets (social performance local and social performance profile). Our sample includes 
between 700 and 1’000 observations in 2013, for which only basic indicators are available, 
such as the standard outreach measures share of female clients and average loan balance as 
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share of GNI per capita. Adding social performance data from the Mix Market reduces or 
sample to between 400 and 600 MFI observations in 2013, depending on the variable con-
sidered. It must be noted that the social performance datasets of the MIX show large 
amounts of non-available observations. This restricts our choice of social performance 
indicators at MFI-level. Nevertheless, the strength of our approach lies in the use of these 
large-scale standardized cross-sectional data on MFI’s social performance that are a close 
proxy to the investment universe of MIVs, with a systematic approach to measuring the 
social performance at MIV level. Data of the MIX are, while being self-reported by MFIs, 
subject to standardized adjustments methods, which make them comparable for all MFIs 
in the data set. 
Indeed, an alternative data source for MFIs’ social performance are social ratings carried 
out by microfinance rating agencies. These ratings analyze and benchmark a wealth of 
indicators and typically aggregate them into a single rating, sometimes combined with a 
graphical representation along several dimensions of social performance. The Rating 
Guide (Clark and Sinha, 2013) helps making the overall ratings comparable. Unfortunate-
ly, however, these ratings analyze only a small part of the MFI universe, which reducing 
the numbers of observations considerably. Moreover, we can assume that the sample of 
rated MFIs is somewhat biased towards MFIs that perform better financially or socially.  
As of now, comparable MIV level data are not publicly available, with the exception of 
the four one-time MIV social ratings presented in Sinha (2010). A desk review of social 
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performance reporting used by major MIVs shows that they mostly use similar measures 
but in different compositions, and also change their reporting over time, making their use 
in an index difficult.  
3.2 SELECTION CRITERIA FOR SOCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Social performance aspects are often qualitative in nature and involve assessing a com-
pany’s stakeholder relationships. The difficulty of measuring non-financial performance 
is widely recognized in the ESG measurement and ratings literature, and is particularly 
emphasized for the social aspects included in ESG measurements (see, for instance, Del-
mas et al., 2013). From a methodological point of view, we need to define formal criteria 
to assess of the quality of the social performance measurement. Some of these criteria are 
applicable to each individual social performance indicator, to the process of selecting 
several indicators included in a social performance assessment, and the process of aggre-
gating such selected indicators into a single measure. Others are applicable in particular 
to the process of selecting and publishing aggregated data.  
We apply such a formal quality assessment framework to microfinance in Table 1. The 
table shows the quality assessment framework developed for ESG ratings by Keller 
(2015) in the two left-hand columns. We apply the framework to the microfinance social 
performance measurement systems that are most relevant to our approach, in the right-
hand column. 
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Table 1 Quality Criteria for Social Performance Measurement in Microfinance 
Criteria Explanation Application to microfinance 
Comparability Are indicators comparable with 
indicators used in other measure-
ment systems? 
How are country-specific  
factors treated?  
MFIs: MIX SP data: yes,  
SP ratings: only aggregated 
measures (through Rating Guide)  
MVIs SP reporting: no 
Independence Is assessor or rater of the perfor-
mance independent of the assessed 
company?  
MFIs: company-reported MIX data, 
payment for SP assessments and 
ratings 
Standardization  Are measurement methods defined 
through standards that are external 
to assessed company? 
MFIs: SPTF, MIX social perfor-
mance (SP) data, Social Rating 
Guide  
MIVs: CGAP Disclosure Guidelines 
Transparency Are measurement methods and 
results published? 
Can they be reproduced by others 
using same methods?  
MFI SP reporting:  
MIX SP data and MFI SP audits and 
ratings: yes  
MIV SP reporting:  
methods and results 
Credibility Are internal, company-based data 
or external, survey-based data 
used? 
Is the quality of self-reported data 
monitored? 
MFIs: MIX: internal;  
SP rating: external when including 
due diligence 
MIVs: internal  
 
Absence of bias Is there a bias towards  
selected ESG issues?  
Can entire investment universe be 
measured? 
Are indicators relevant for micro-
finance social performance? Do 
they exclude types of MFIs / MIVs?  
Do they cover E/G issues? 
Measurability Share of quantitative vs. qualitative 
indicators?  
Transformation of qualitative into 
quantitative indicators? 
Different shares in each measure-
ment system; transformation into 
ordinal or cardinal indicators 
common  
Quality: 
- Reliability 
 
 
- Validity 
 
- Timeliness 
 
- Can assessor or rater decide on 
how to measure SP value of an 
indicator?  
- Does indicator measure intended 
aspect? 
- Is indicator score available timely 
and frequently?  
 
Reliability low for many, or validity 
low for some of the standard indi-
cators 
Timeliness: MFI: SP ratings irregu-
lar, MIX SP performance yearly; 
MIV SP reporting: yearly  
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A first conclusion is that the existing microfinance social performance measurement sys-
tems and the resulting datasets cannot satisfy all criteria listed in Table 1. Some trade-offs 
are unavoidable and occur frequently, for instance between comparability and bias, or 
timeliness and independence. In order to select a set of indicators and construct an ag-
gregate measure, we need to base the procedure on the largest numbers of comparable 
observations possible, both in terms of MFI-year and of MIV-year observations.  
3.3 SET OF SOCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Several approaches exist to account for social performance measures both for MFIs and 
MIVs. Table 2 shows an overview of the indicators mentioned most often in the literature. 
Specifically, we draw from the lists of indicators used in the CGAP Disclosure Guidelines 
(2010), the more general Principles for Investors in Inclusive Finance (PIIF, 2012), the MIV 
ratings by M-CRIL (Sinha 2010), and the indicators reported in the Symbiotics MIV sur-
veys (Symbiotics, 2014; 2013).  
Table 2 MIV Social Performance Categories and Indicators 
 
MFI Level Indicators 
MFI Practice 
MFI Mission 
MFI Target Market 
Poverty Target 
Offer of microenterprise loans 
Offer of consumer loans 
Offer of savings products 
Offer of insurance 
Offer of other financial services 
Offer of nonfinancial services 
Share of voluntary savers as % of active borrowers 
Regulatory status 
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Treatment of Staff 
Number of employees 
Transparency of costs of services to clients (interest rates) 
Human resources 
Staff incentives to avoid client over-indebtedness 
Employment creation and enterprises financed 
Client protection principles endorsed 
Tracking client protection issues 
Outreach 
Outreach 
Female customers 
Rural customers 
Average loan size to active borrower (USD) per GNI 
Average number of active borrowers financed 
Average number of savers served 
Collateral (accept social collateral) 
Client retention rate 
Client poverty level outcomes 
Hired (non-family) employment 
Governance 
Reporting of ESG information to investors 
Review of MFI's policies and procedures related to CSR 
Existence of staff training in ESG practices 
Requirement of anticorruption policies 
Environment 
Social responsibility to the environment 
Environmental exclusion list 
 
Fund level Indicators 
Social development mission 
Social goals and monitoring their achievement on fund level 
Pursuing balanced long-term returns that reflect interests of clients 
Contribution to financial market development 
Local currency 
Tier category of MFIs / size of MFIs 
Countries of low development (HDI) 
Governance practices 
Reporting of ESG information to investors 
Review of MFI's policies and procedures related to CSR 
Staff training in ESG practices 
Requirement of anticorruption policies / internal whistle-blowing procedures 
Number of board seats with MFIs 
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Environment practices 
Environmental exclusion list 
Assessment of MFI's environmental exclusion list 
Environmental issues integrated in investment decision 
Compensation for carbon emission 
Assessment of Microfinance Service Provider’s Potential Environmental Risks 
Outreach (fund level) 
Average investment size to MFI 
Client exit rate 
Monitoring MFIs 
Guidance to investees on CPP 
Monitoring costs to clients 
Monitoring HR policies 
Monitoring gender issues 
Monitoring environmental issues 
Referring to our formal quality criteria for social performance measurement, we discuss 
advantages and disadvantages for these indicators and decide on a set of indicators ap-
propriate for our purpose. Arguably, this proceeding is subject to transparency and quali-
ty issues in itself, and inferior to a DEA-based approach, which, however, would rely on 
the full MIV portfolio information of underlying MFIs. In the absence of such data, ours 
is a more pragmatic approach.  
Social performance from the perspective of a microfinance investor can be broken down 
into different categories or dimensions (depicted in the left-hand box in Figure 1 above). 
We divide first between aspects concerning the underlying and aspects concerning the 
investment vehicle itself. Aspects on MFI level (underlying) are usually further distin-
guished into the practice of the MFI, the outreach and aspects of governance and envi-
ronment (see for instance Symbiotics, 2014; CGAP, 2010; Zeller et al., 2003). For funds, the 
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literature identifies indicators on the mission of a fund, the investment strategy, and gov-
ernance / environmental practices (CGAP, 2010; Sinha, 2010). 
The formal quality criteria of comparability, independence, standardization, transparency 
and credibility apply first and foremost to the process of selecting and aggregating the 
indicators. This process in turn depends on the data provider used. Even within the da-
tasets provided by the same provider, the formal quality criteria absence of bias, measur-
ability, and quality in a narrow sense (including reliability, validity and timeliness) vary 
between the individual indicators.  
For MFI data of the underlying, those provided in a social audit or rating are typically 
more comparable, independent, and standardized than those provided by the organiza-
tion (MIV or MFI) itself through reports or standardized self-reporting into a database 
(such as the MIX). On the other hand, they are not necessarily more transparent and cred-
ible. Transparency in the sense of replicability is, for instance, particularly affected when 
an individual has to assign rankings, and this applies to individuals regardless whether 
they are external or internal to the MFI (or MIV). For the reasons described above, we do 
not use the smaller data universe of MFI data from audits or ratings but the somewhat 
less independent but much larger database of the MIX.  
We do not have a comparable empirical database of MIV-level social performance data, 
as discussed above. The first option is to rely on the detailed social performance or sus-
tainability reporting done by the MIVs. As discussed, such data is often not available for 
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individual MIVs or funds but for the entire asset management company; it is not stand-
ardized, and not independent. Individual indicators used within such reports may be 
comparable, standardized and credible. However, standardized reporting, for instance 
following the MIV Disclosure Guidelines (CGAP, 2010) would be needed to use such 
company reporting as the basis for our measurement. The second option is, therefore, to 
collect the data through a primary survey tool, although such self-reported data suffers 
from the same problem of low independence as do the MIX data at MFI level. 
We show the set of social performance categories and variables for our proposed ap-
proach in Table 8 in the appendix, with MFI data of the underlying drawn from the MIX, 
and MIV-level data drawn from our proposed primary data collection survey. We assess 
the formal quality of the indicators received through this process, in terms of their ab-
sence of bias, measurability, and quality.  
We exclude certain types of indicators based on the formal quality criteria catalogue de-
veloped above. We find that for our set of indicators, several criteria matter particularly: 
their standardization, which is directly related to the availability of data for the SP per-
formance of MFIs and MVIs, their relevance for microfinance (bias), the difficulty to cor-
rectly measure the indicator (reliability), and concerns whether indicators really indicate 
the level of social performance (validity). Moreover, in addition to the formal criteria, 
more pragmatic considerations also lead us to exclude certain indicators, in particular 
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double-counting (we find certain indicators to be already captured in another indicator), 
and last but not least, data availability.  
Table 8 in the appendix shows the indicators that we include but also those that are fre-
quently used in the literature but neglected for the purpose of our aggregate measure. 
Some of those exclusions are based on a lack of observations in the MIX MFI social per-
formance database, such as the offer of consumption loans versus microenterprise loans 
versus, employment creation and enterprises financed through an MFI, and staff incen-
tives used in an MFI. The latter also reveals difficulties regarding bias and comparability. 
Indicators regarding MFI staff, number of employees, human resource policies are ex-
cluded for reasons of bias, as staff is not main focus of microfinance social performance, 
compared to its clients. Even with respect to outreach to clients, we need to exclude 
measurements of the client poverty level outcomes and hired (non-family) employment 
for lack of observations in our data set. The monitoring of client protection is somewhat 
captured in another variable, the endorsement of the client protection principles. Lastly, 
environmental issues are excluded for the purpose of a social performance measurement 
of MIVs, as they go beyond the social intention and the double bottom-line of micro-
finance.  
3.4 RATING FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
As typical for ESG performance indicators, the different social performance variables in-
troduced above are, to a large extent, qualitative variables, not necessarily of the same 
type, nor using the same scale. When defining uniform rankings for qualitative variables, 
19 
 
  
the operationalization, i.e. the categorization of the different characteristics of the varia-
bles, largely influences results (Diekmann, 2010). It is particularly important as the social 
performance indicators for the underlying in our overall MIV assessment are secondary 
data. They range from nominal or ordinary variables taking values of 0 or 1 or between 1 
and 5, to interval or ratio variables, measurable in absolute or percentage values. ESG 
ratings usually resolve this issue by transforming and standardizing all variables to the 
same specification. For example, RobecoSAM attributes values between 0 and 100 
(RobecoSAM, 2014) to the questions included in its corporate sustainability assessment 
methodology. These metrics are then analyzed in comparison to sector peers in order to 
calculate appropriate rankings; a similar proceeding is chosen in other types of ESG rat-
ings. 
Following this approach, we compute a ranking between 1 and 10 for each indicator 
based on the mean, median and distribution parameters of MFI data obtained from MIX, 
representing best the microfinance industry. Table 3 shows the methodology applied to 
create this rating framework, which depends on the characteristics of each indicator. For 
ordinal indicators with only two characteristics (yes / no), the grade is assigned using the 
minimum and the maximum of the scale defined (1 or 10). Ordinal indicators with more 
than two characteristics (e.g. a rating or ranking from 1 to 12) are linearly transformed 
into values between 1 and 10.  
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Table 3 Types and Measurement of Indicators at MFI Level  
Indicator Scale Data Source Categories Type of data 
source 
Rank 
MFI Mission Nominal MIX Rank (1-12) Distribution 1 to 10 
MFI Target Market Nominal MIX Rank (1-4) Distribution 1 to 10 
Poverty Target Ordinal MIX Low Income 
No specific 
focus 
Poor clients 
Very poor 
clients 
1 to 4 1 to 10 
Offer microenter-
prise loans / con-
sumer loans / sav-
ings products / 
insurance / other 
financial services / 
nonfinancial ser-
vices 
Ordinal MIX Yes / No Yes / No 1 or 10 
Client protection 
principles endorsed 
Ordinal Smart Cam-
paign 
Yes / No Yes / No 1 or 10 
Outreach Ordinal MIX Large, Medi-
um, Small 
1 to 3 1/5.5/10 
Female customers 
Rural customers 
Ratio MIX Percentage Distribution 1 to 10 
Average loan size 
to active borrower 
(USD) per GNI 
Ratio MIX USD Distribution 1 to 10 
Number of active 
borrowers financed 
/ Number of savers 
served 
Ratio MIX Number Distribution 1 to 10 
Borrower retention 
rate 
Ratio  MIX % Distribution 1 to 10 
For variables of the ratio scale type, we use the distribution of the indicators across the 
MIX MFI sample (data for the year 2013) in order to define the appropriate scale for the 
respective variable and assign the ranking accordingly. To illustrate our proceeding, we 
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use the share of female borrowers. We assign an average rank of 5 not necessarily for in-
stitutions with a 50% share of female borrowers but rather a rank corresponding to the 
distribution of the observed values among all MFIs in the MIX sample. We then use the 
following transformation formula to convert values from the percentile distribution of 
the peer MFIs into a standardized scale (see for example Fahrmeir et al., 2002):  
11
2
22
1 )*( Mss
MXX +−=  (1) 
with: 
X1  = Standardized value of the observation 
X2  = Observation 
M1 = Average of standardized distribution 
M2 = Average of observed distribution 
s1  = Standard deviation of standardized distribution 
s2  = Standard deviation of observed distribution 
 
Resulting is a set of identically scaled indicators capturing the social performance varia-
bles used at MFI-level, corresponding to Step 1a in Figure 1 above. 
3.5 CALCULATION OF SOCIAL PERFORMANCE ON FUND LEVEL 
3.5.1 UNDERLYING 
The social performance at fund level is calculated according to the process depicted in 
Figure 1 above. Once the different social performance measures are ranked on a uniform 
scale, we aggregate them to a single metric representing the MIV according to its under-
lying portfolio (Step 1b in the upper part of the figure). Requirement for this step is that 
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the portfolio details of an MIV are available. Moreover, we need to weigh the positions in 
different MFIs. First, funds are invested in different types of MFIs, which requires certain 
measures of social performance to be calculated based on the weight of a certain MFI in-
vestment in the fund portfolio. Second, funds usually only finance parts of an institution, 
meaning that certain performance measures need to be weighed according to the share 
that a fund holds in an MFI. Particularly important is this weighting approach for out-
reach-related indicators, mostly the number of clients served.4 As a result, we obtain a set 
of social performance rankings weighed according to the MIV portfolio.  
We aggregate those different indicators into one social performance measures represent-
ing the underlying. The aggregation of these different social performance measures leads 
again to a question of weights. Either all social performance indicators are incorporated 
equally in the final grade or some indicators are defined to be more or less important, 
involving special weighting techniques as discussed above. Chen and Delmas (2010) 
compare different approaches for the case of corporate social performance and show that 
changes in the weights of aggregation can lead to significant implications on the distribu-
tions of the parameters (mean and variance). We, therefore, need to demonstrate the ef-
fects of different weights in a robustness analysis of our index.  
4  These considerations regarding the weighting apply for companies invested in MFIs using both debt 
and equity. 
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3.5.2 FUND LEVEL 
The next step (still within Step 1b in the top part of Figure 1 above) is to adjust the MIV-
level social performance result based on the underlying for social performance factors for 
the MIV itself (see Table 8). It is important that indicators are not double-counted in the 
resulting the social performance metric. For example, questions related to client protec-
tion principles can be captured at fund level, as proposed in the guidance to investees on 
CPP (SDC, 2010) and at MFI level at the same time, as suggested in the CPP endorsement 
(Pistelli et al., 2014; CGAP, 2010). To avoid overestimating the influence of such indica-
tors through such double counting, we focus on the MFI level measure in such cases. 
The challenge with regards to social performance metrics on MIV level is data availabil-
ity. Unfortunately, funds do not publish information relevant for our purpose on their 
websites or in their reports. A survey among fund managers or social performance repre-
sentatives is, therefore, an unavoidable step to complement our social performance 
measure.5 The survey results in a distribution of the social performance observations 
among all participating MIVs that can be used to calculate appropriate ranks of individu-
al ratio-type variables. 
Once results of such a survey are available, we can then apply the methodology describe 
above for the indicators at MIV level, depending on their scale (see Table 4).  
5  The survey should consist of a short questionnaire on the main social performance variables identified 
as most relevant (see Table 8). 
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Table 4 Types and Measurement of Indicators at MIV Level  
Indicator Scale Data Source Categories Type of data 
source 
Rank 
Pursuing balanced 
long-term returns 
that reflect interests 
of clients 
Nominal Survey / 
Websites 
Rank (1-3) 1 to 3 1 to 10 
Local currency Ratio Survey / 
Websites 
Percentage Distribution 1 to 10 
Tier category of 
MFIs / size of MFIs 
Ratio Survey / 
Websites 
Percentage Distribution 1 to 10 
Countries of low 
development (HDI) 
Ratio Survey / 
Websites 
Percentage Distribution 1 or 10 
Reporting of ESG 
information to in-
vestors 
Nominal Survey / 
Websites 
Yes / No Yes / No 1 or 10 
Requirement of 
anticorruption pol-
icies and/or internal 
whistle-blowing 
procedures 
Nominal Survey / 
Websites 
Yes / No Yes / No 1 or 10 
 
Finally, to combine the social performance measurement of the underlying with the social 
performance indicators at fund level (Step 2 in the above Figure 1), we, again, need to 
show the effects of different weighting approaches. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 RANKINGS FOR DIFFERENT MEASURES ON MFI LEVEL 
4.1.1 MFI LEVEL: PRACTICE 
To assess the practice of an MFI with regards to social performance, we distinguish the 
four main pillars mission, target market, product offer, and endorsement of the client 
protection principles (CPP). We use MFI level data from MIX to show how we rank insti-
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tutions. Due to the scaling and measurement techniques used in the data, several indica-
tors show relatively low validity or reliability, as shown in Table 8 in the appendix, which 
leads us to excluding them from our final metric.  
We show this exclusion decision for the example of the mission of MFIs, a main element 
of social performance. The mission is supplied in MIX social performance survey data, in 
which MFI respondents weight certain aspects of mission with their importance for their 
institution (from 1 to 12, 1 being the most important). Answer categorizations based on 
such a ranking methodology (as opposite to a rating methodology, where answers are 
classified on a scale) cannot be used for the purpose of our social performance measure-
ment (Diekmann, 2005).  
Figure 2 MFIs’ Mission: Ranking of Poverty Reduction 2013, n=642 
 
Source: Underlying, original data from Microfinance Information eXchange  
26 
 
  
We exemplify this by using poverty reduction (povertyreduction) as one of the criteria be-
longing to the mission according to MIX (see Figure 2). In the 2013 data, 47% of the 642 
MFIs reporting data assign poverty reduction with the highest importance among their 
mission (1). 
Furthermore, the validity and reliability of the indicator is affected because of the need to 
decide which subcategory assigned to mission is, in turn, “more” or “less” social than 
povertyreduction, and whether a certain rank for a specific category (e.g. povertyreduction 
below 5) should be denominated as being “not social”. The same limitations apply to the 
variable “target market” in the MIX dataset. We, therefore, do not include either variable 
in our aggregated metric. 
To cover the mission of the underlying, we use the more specific variable “poverty tar-
get”, (612 observations in the 2013 MIX data). This variable has four characteristics (target 
very poor clients, poor clients, low income clients, no specific focus) that can be ordered 
according to social importance and converted into a standardized ranking between 1 and 
10 (using linear conversion), shown as follows: 
Poverty Target 
Characteristic Very Poor Clients Poor Clients Low Income Clients No Specific Focus 
Rank 10 7 4 1 
 
For our second set of variables for the practice of MFIs, the offer of financial products 
other than loans, we take into account savings, insurance, other financial, and non-
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financial services. These variables are ranked with values of 10 if the respective service is 
offered, and 1, else. 
Criteria: Offer Characteristic Rank Characteristic Rank 
Savings Yes 10 No 1 
Insurance Yes 10 No 1 
Other financial services Yes 10 No 1 
Non-financial services Yes 10 No 1 
 
Data regarding the endorsement of the CPP are drawn from the website of the Smart 
Campaign6. 29 MFIs are certified by March 2015.7 Endorsement of the principles is anoth-
er variable taking the rank 10 for yes or 1 for no, respectively.  
4.1.2 MFI LEVEL: OUTREACH 
To assess the outreach of the services of microfinance institutions we take into account 
several social performance measures. MIX data include a standardized outreach variable 
(outreach) based on the relative size of an MFI in its market. We also include several vari-
ables which are typically taken as proxies for outreach to the poor in microfinance in the 
literature, such as percentage of female borrowers, percentage of borrowers living in ru-
ral areas, average loan size in comparison to the per-capita income in the country, num-
bers of borrowers and savers served (see for example Hermes et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2007; 
Conning, 1999; among others). 
6  http://smartcampaign.org/certification/certified-organizations, accessed on March 23 2015. 
7  The list of MFIs that are listed as certified by the Smart Campaign is available in the attachment. 
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The outreach variable collected by MIX has only three specifications (namely large, me-
dium, small), which leads us to the following ranking 
Outreach 
Characteristic Large Medium Small 
Rank 10 5.5 1 
 
The percentage of female borrowers, measured on a ratio scale, is another variable fre-
quently taken as proxy for outreach. Figure 3 shows the percentile distribution in the MIX 
2013 sample. The median of the 738 institutions reporting their share of female borrowers 
is at 61.625%, and the average institution serves more than 50% female clients (mean = 
63.3%). 
Figure 3 Percentiles of MFIs’ Female Customers in 2013, n=738 (in %) 
 
Source: Underlying, original data from Microfinance Information eXchange  
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Applying the calculation introduced in equation (1), we obtain the adjusted rank for the 
variable female as follows: 
Share of female clients served 
Characteristic 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Rank 1.7 2.9 4.0 5.1 6.3 7.4 8.5 9.6 
 
For the percentage of borrowers living in rural areas we unfortunately do not have suffi-
cient observations to calculate appropriate rankings. 
The average loan outstanding among active borrowers is commonly used as another 
proxy for outreach in microfinance. In order to account for regional economic differences, 
we use the standardized measure in relation to the average Gross National Income (GNI) 
per capita. Figure 4 shows large variation of this variable in the MIX data.  
Figure 4 Percentiles of MFIs’ Average Loan Size to Active Borrowers per GNI in 
2013, n=738 
 
Source: Underlying, original data from Microfinance Information eXchange  
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The largest percentile (100%) includes observations much higher than the average, which 
is 77.95. The result of this wide distribution of observed values is that the expected varia-
tion of the ranking is very small. As average loan size is an inverse proxy for social per-
formance (the higher the average loan size, the “less social” the MFI is deemed), the dis-
tribution is incorporated in the resulting rating for this indicator: 
Average loan size to active borrowers per GNI per capita 
Characteristic 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Rank 5.9 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.2 5 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 
 
A similar distribution results for the average number of active borrowers served by an 
institution (Figure 5).  
Figure 5 Percentiles of MFI’s Numbers of Active Borrowers in 2013, n=981 
 
Source: Underlying, original data from Microfinance Information eXchange  
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For the example of observations lying between 200’000 and 800’000 (or more) active bor-
rowers, we obtain the following ranking: 
Number of active borrowers 
Characteristic 200’000 300’000 400’000 500’000 600’000 700’000 800’000 
Rank 6.1 6.8 7.4 8.1 8.7 9.4 10.0 
 
For those institutions offering savings services, we also use the number of depositors as 
an outreach indicator (see Figure 6). The ranking of non-deposit taking MFIs is not influ-
enced by this measure. We account for the fact to offer savings services in the variable 
introduced above, avoiding double counting.  
Figure 6 Percentiles of MFIs’ Numbers of Active Depositors in 2013, n=446 
 
Source: Underlying, original data from Microfinance Information eXchange 
Again assessing sample observations between 200’000 and 800’000 depositors, we obtain 
the following ranking: 
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Number of active depositors 
Characteristic 200’000 300’000 400’000 500’000 600’000 700’000 800’000 
Rank 5.6 6.1 6.5 7.0 7.5 7.9 8.4 
 
Our last indicator for MFI-level outreach is the borrower retention rate, which measures 
the share of borrowers that are returning customers. The maximum value that this varia-
ble takes in our dataset is above 100%, as 31 MFI report higher values in 2013, due to 
some double-counting of clients with multiple contracts. Not adjusting for this double-
counting shows the following percentile distribution (Figure 7) and ranking.  
Figure 7: Unadjusted Percentiles of MFIs’ Borrower Retention Rate in 2013, n=401 
 
Source: Underlying, original data from Microfinance Information eXchange  
Borrower retention rate 
Characteristic 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 
Rank 1.1 2.5 4.0 5.4 6.8 8.2 9.7 
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The use of the MIX database results in the ranking of each MFI-level social performance 
variable included in our overall social performance metric benchmarked against the year 
2013. To calibrate this for a specific MIV requires full disclosure of the MFI’s underlying 
portfolio. As discussed above, this can be obtained (if at all) only through a survey 
among interested MIVs, planned as a next step in our research.  
4.2 AGGREGATION OF MFI LEVEL DATA 
In the absence of MIV-level observations, we use a fictional MIV called “Global Micro-
finance Fund (GMF)” as example. The GMF is invested in three MFIs through debt as of 
December 2013 (see Table 5).  
Table 5 Portfolio of GMF as of December 31st 2013 
Name of the MFI Total Assets of MFI Share financed 
through GMF 
Amount funded by 
GMF 
Share in the MIV 
portfolio 
MFI 1 1’000’000 10% 100’000 13% 
MFI 2 1’200’000 13% 150’000 20% 
MFI 3 2’000’000 25% 500’000 67% 
To demonstrate the calculation of the social performance ranks for the MFIs in GMF’s 
portfolio, we use MFI 1 as an example (see Table 6). We refer to the MFI-level variable 
rankings deducted above in order to assign respective values. 
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Table 6 Calculation of Social Performance Rank for MFI 1 
MFI 1 Characteristics Rank 
Poverty Target Poor clients 6.7 
Savings Yes 10 
Insurance Yes 10 
Other financial services Yes 10 
Nonfinancial services Yes 10 
Endorsement of Client Protection Principles Yes 10 
Outreach Medium 5.5 
Female clients 70% 6.3 
Average loan size to active borrower per GNI 10% 5.9 
Average number of active borrowers financed 400’000 5.7 
Average number of depositors 300’000 6.1 
Borrower retention rate 0.6 2.5 
Average  7.5 
We use an equally weighting approach to aggregate the different social performance 
measures for each MFI in this simplified example. A more comprehensive weighting ap-
proach is only useful with more and empirical data available.8  
Next, we determine the social performance rating at fund level based on the individual 
MFI rankings. We weigh them with the share of the respective MFI in the MIV portfolio 
and receive a preliminary average rank for the GMF, based only on the social perfor-
mance of the underlying, of 5.51 (see Table 7).9 
8  Once MIV data are available it is possible to calculate different weighed indices and to compare the 
approaches. 
9  As discussed above, the variable average number of depositors is only applicable for the two institutions 
offering savings possibilities (MFI 1 and MFI 2). This variable is therefore weighted according to the 
shares of the two institutions in the portfolio, neglecting MFI 3. 
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Table 7 Ranks for Different Variables of MFIs in GMF’s Portfolio 
Variables MFI 1 MFI 2 MFI 3 
Weighted according 
to MIV portfolio 
Poverty Target 6.7 4.3 9.0 7.76 
Savings 10 10 1 3.97 
Insurance 10 10 1 3.97 
Other financial services 10 1 1 2.17 
Nonfinancial services 10 1 1 2.17 
Endorsement of Client Protection Principles 10 1 10 8.20 
Outreach 5.5 5.5 10 8.52 
Female clients 6.3 4.0 7.4 6.58 
Average loan size to active borrower per GNI 5.9 5.7 4.8 5.12 
Average number of active borrowers financed 5.7 6.1 6.1 6.05 
Average number of depositors 6.1 7.5 n/a 6.95 
Borrower retention rate 2.5 8.2 4.0 4.65 
Average 7.5 5.2 5.0 5.51 
Note that Table 7 does not show the final social performance metric that the fictional 
GMF investment vehicle would obtain but covers only the social performance of GMF’s 
underlying.  
4.3 SOCIAL PERFORMANCE ON FUND LEVEL 
In a last step, we need to complement the social performance ranking based on the results 
of the underlying by factors concerning the MIV itself. Table 8 in the appendix captures 
the variables to be incorporated in this step. 
However, without gathering primary data from MIVs, we cannot determine rankings for 
those variables to be used our GMF example. For instance, MIVs do not systematically 
publish their local currency exposure, the share of investment in least developed coun-
tries, or the tier category or size of the MFIs in their portfolios.  
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To fully apply our proposed measurement at MIV level, calibrate the rankings, and ag-
gregate all results into one social performance metric, the MIV social performance index, , 
we need data on a larger part of the MIV universe.  
Nevertheless, our example so far shows the main steps in our proposed methodology to 
establish such a metric for MIVs, which can be applied once MIV-level data are available. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
The development of a standardized methodology to assess and publish social perfor-
mance at MIV level is still in early stages. To date, the MIV Disclosure Guidelines (CGAP, 
2010) have the character of non-binding recommendations. In practice, MIVs’ different 
approaches to measure and disclose social performance are not standardized and not 
comparable among the different vehicles. We discuss different social performance meas-
urement approaches and propose an efficient catalogue of social performance indicators, 
respecting a catalogue of formal quality criteria for individual indicators, their selection, 
and aggregation.  
Our approach combines data at MFI level with information on the MIVs. The final social 
performance index characterizing MIVs consists of a set of variables representing the 
practice and the mission of the underlying MFIs, outreach indicators at MFI level, as well 
as indicators quantifying the mission of the MIV, the contribution to financial market de-
velopment, and governance matters at MIV level.  
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Our methodology to calculate rankings for MFI level data differentiates between varia-
bles according to their scale type. In particular for ratio variables, we calibrate our rank-
ing against the use MFIs reporting to MIX as the broadest available representation of the 
investment universe of MIVs. For reasons of data availability, we use an equal weighting 
approach to aggregate the different social performance metrics calculated into one index 
representing an exemplary MIV. 
In order to apply the social performance measurement developed in this paper, and to 
understand implications of important methodological choices such as weighting and lin-
earity assumptions, the analysis needs empirical data on the portfolio composition and 
certain social-performance related practices of the MIVs. We propose such a data collec-
tion of the defined social performance metrics among MIVs as a next step to demonstrate 
and test our approach.   
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APPENDIX 
Table 8 Quality assessment of frequently used MIV social performance indicators  
  
 Absence of bias Measurability Quality Other Decision 
MFI level indicators using MIX social performance data  
MFI Practice           
MFI Mission High. Relates to aim of MF 
Medium. Coding 
required 
Medium. What is 
"more social"?  Infrequent change No 
MFI Target Market High. Relates to aim of MF 
Medium. Coding 
required 
Medium. What is 
"more social"?   No 
Poverty Target High. Relates to aim of MF High High validity  Yes 
Offer of microenterprise loans High. Relates to aim of MF 
Low. Ordinal 
yes/no 
Low validity. What 
is "more social"? 
Insufficient 
variation in data No 
Offer of consumer loans Medium Low. Ordinal yes/no 
Which product is 
"more social"? 
Insufficient 
observations No 
Offer of savings products High. Relates to aim of MF 
Low. Ordinal 
yes/no Medium reliability  Yes 
Offer of insurance High. Relates to aim of MF 
Low. Ordinal 
yes/no Medium reliability   Yes 
Offer of other financial services High. Product differentiation 
Low. Ordinal 
yes/no Medium reliability   Yes 
Offer of nonfinancial services Medium. Context-specific 
Low. Ordinal 
yes/no 
Medium. What is 
"more social"? 
Insufficient 
observations Yes 
Share of voluntary savers as % of 
active borrowers 
Medium. Context-
specific High 
Medium. Specific 
legal form/country 
correlated to 
savings PF No 
Regulatory status Medium. Context-specific 
Medium. Ranking 
required 
Low validity. What 
is "more social"?   No 
Treatment of Staff Medium. Context-specific Low Low reliability   No 
Number of employees Medium. Context-specific High 
Low validity: larger 
not better   No 
Transparency of costs of services to 
clients (interest rates) 
High. Relates to 
aim of MF Low    Low reliability 
Included in CPP 
endorsement No 
Human resources Medium Low Medium validity and reliability.   No 
Staff incentives to avoid client over-
indebtedness High Low Low   No 
Employment creation and 
enterprises financed High 
Medium. USSPM, 
CPP 
Low, not 
standardized 
Insufficient 
observations No 
Client protection principles 
endorsed High High Medium   Yes 
Tracking client protection issues High Low at MFI level Low. Complex, composite   No 
Outreach           
Outreach High High High Standardized MIX measurement Yes 
Female customers High High Medium. Context-specific   Yes 
Rural customers High Medium Medium. Context-specific 
Insufficient 
observations No 
Av.loan size to active borrower 
(USD) per GNI High High 
Medium. 
Averages, no 
distribution 
  Yes 
Average number of active borrowers 
financed High High Medium validity   Yes 
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Average number of savers served High Medium. Dormant accounts? High   Yes 
Collateral (accept social collateral) Medium Low High Insufficient observations No 
Client retention rate Medium High Medium validity for borrowers   Yes 
Client poverty level outcomes Medium. MFI-specific Medium Low reliability   No 
Hired (non-family) employment High Low    Low reliability Insufficient observations No 
Governance           
Reporting of ESG information to 
investors 
Low. Not main aim 
of MF 
High. yes/no 
variable Low validity      No 
Review of MFI's policies and 
procedures related to CSR 
Low. Not main aim 
of MF 
High. yes/no 
variable Low validity      No 
Existence of staff training in ESG 
practices 
Low. Not main aim 
of MF 
High. yes/no 
variable Low validity      No 
Requirement of anticorruption 
policies 
Low. Not main aim 
of MF 
High. yes/no 
variable Low validity      No 
Environment           
Social responsibility to the 
environment 
Low. Not main aim 
of MF 
High. Ordinal 
yes/no variable Low validity      No 
Environmental exclusion list Low. Not main aim of MF 
High. Ordinal 
yes/no variable Low validity      No 
 
Fund Level Indicators using primary MIV-level survey data  
Social development mission           
Social goals and monitoring their 
achievement on fund level High Low 
Low. Complex 
measure   No 
Pursuing balanced long-term returns 
that reflect interests of clients High 
Medium. Mission 
statement 
Low. Complex 
measure   Yes 
Contribution to financial market 
development           
Local currency High High High   Yes 
Tier category of MFIs / size of MFIs High Medium High Complex, composed Yes 
Countries of low development (HDI) High High High   Yes 
Governance practices           
Reporting of ESG information to 
investors Medium 
High. Ordinal 
yes/no variable Low validity   Yes 
Review of MFI's policies and 
procedures related to CSR Medium Low Low validity   No 
Staff training in ESG practices High Low Low validity   No 
Requirement of anticorruption 
policies / internal whistle-blowing 
procedures 
Medium High. Ordinal yes/no variable Low validity   Yes 
Number of board seats with MFIs Low High Low validity   No 
Environment practices           
Environmental exclusion list Low. Not main business of MF Medium Low validity   No 
Assessment of MFI's environmental 
exclusion list 
Low. Not main 
business of MF High Low validity   No 
Environmental issues integrated in 
investment decision 
Low. Not main 
business of MF Low Low validity   No 
Compensation for carbon emission Low. Not main business of MF High Low validity   No 
Assessment of Microfinance Service 
Provider’s Potential Environmental 
Risks 
Low. Not main 
business of MF High Low validity   No 
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Outreach (fund level)           
Average investment size to MFI High High Low validity. What is "more social"?   No 
Client exit rate High High High Captured at MFI level No 
Monitoring MFIs           
Guidance to investees on CPP High High. Ordinal yes/no High 
Captured at MFI 
level No 
Monitoring costs to clients High High. Ordinal yes/no High 
Captured at MFI 
level No 
Monitoring HR policies Low. Not main aim of MF 
High. Ordinal 
yes/no High   No 
Monitoring gender issues High High. Ordinal yes/no High 
Captured at MFI 
level No 
Monitoring environmental issues Low. Not main aim of MF 
High. Ordinal 
yes/no High   No 
 
 
Figure 8 List of MFIs certified by Smart Campaign to apply client protection principles 
List of certified MFIs as of March 2015 
 
Ujjivan 
Partner   
EKI 
Grameen Koota 
Cashpor 
Mi-Bospo 
Crezcamos 
Fundación Mundo Mujer 
Pro Mujer - Mexico 
Equitas 
Swadhaar 
BancoSol 
LOLC Micro Credit Ltd. 
CRECER 
Opportunity Bank Serbia 
Kompanion 
MDO Arvand 
Bai Tushum Bank 
Fundación Delamujer 
EDPYME Raíz 
Finamérica S.A. 
Compartamos 
MicroCred 
VisionFund AzerCredit 
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